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much constitutional difficulty in the substitution of an appraisal for the upset
price as the measure for the payment of dissenters, particularly where con-
venience and the equities of the situation, as found by a judge, dictate such
a result, and where support for the plan, though not two-thirds support, is
bound to be "substantial".
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENTAND MARKETING CONTROL
PuBrac CONCERN with the efforts of the federal government to alleviate a
recurring farm problem by measures aimed at production control and soil
conservation1 has tended to obscure the disorganized condition of agricul-
tural marketing and the attempt to solve that problem by action under the
marketing control provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.2 The
marketing problem has been more acute in the case of such commodities as
milk, fruits, and other perishables than in that of basic commodities like cot-
ton, wheat, and corn.3 The difficulty of carrying over perishable and semi-
perishable products makes it imperative to sell them immediately upon
arrival at distribution points; and the heavy selling pressure thus built up
at the season's peak frequently has a depressing influence on retail prices
which is reflected in lower prices to the producer. Likewise, well-organized
central markets such as exist for basic commodities are largely lacking, with
the result that producers are compelled to deal with small wholesalers or
commission houses whose independent efforts may cause glutted markets in
certain localities at a time when others are relatively under-supplied. Fur-
thermore, there are no futures exchanges similar to those for staple products
which make continuous price quotations easily available to the producer and
permit the shifting of risk through hedging operations by cooperative asso-
ciations.
4
1. See generally BLACK, AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES (1929);
EZEKIEL AND BEAN, Ecoo mIIc BASES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT Acr (U. S.
Dep't Agric. 1933): 1 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS (1933) 497: ROYAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WORLD AGRICULTURE, Ax INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (1932);
Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculture (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 878;
Kern, Federal Farm Legislation: A Factual Appraisal (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 984;
Legis. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 878.
2. 48 STAT. 31 (1933). as amended by 49 STAT. 750. 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 601-24 (Supp.
1935).
3. See Black, op. cit. supra note 1, c.xviii; Hearings before Committee on Agri-
culture on H. R. 5585, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 103.
4. See Hearings before Committee on Agriculture aid Forestry on H. R. 3835,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 92 et seq.; Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry on S. Res. 374, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931). For a description of the
marketing situation after the war, see Report of the Federal Trade Commission on
the Wholesale Marketing of Food (1920) 76 et seq. In its report the Federal Trade
Commission recommended the establishment under iederal control or through federal
funds of central food markets and terminals, storage warehouses, refrigerator lines, and
other marketing devices. Although these recommendations have failed to become law,
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The relative seriousness of the marketing problem in the field of non-basic
commodities, together with the fact that the difficulties of surplus production
were less pressing there than in the case of basic commodities, may have
suggested the use of different control techniques to those who were attempt-
ing to devise a comprehensive plan for agricultural relief. Whatever the
reasons,5 Congress limited the production control and processing tax features
of the Adjustment Act to basic commodities, and devised a scheme for the
control of marketing, which, although worded so as to be applicable to all
forms of agriculture, has thus far been applied principally only to non-basic
products. 6 Under this scheme, the quantity of produce which could be mar-
keted was to be limited by voluntary agreement to be enforced against all
shippers, including those not party to the agreement, by a system of licens-
ing under the order of the Secretary of Agriculture.7 Furthermore, prices
and trade practices were to be regulated by agreement with a view to stabil-
izing markets." It should be noted, however, that although this plan
emphasized the control of marketing, it made possible an indirect control of
production to the extent that the restriction of marketing would influence
producers to decrease their output.
the proposal that wholesale dealers be required to secure federal licenses, that unfair
conduct in the interstate marketing of food be prohibited, and that federal inspection
and standards be provided, has been adopted in the PmmsnAnLE AGRICULTunA C0s-
-MODrriEs Act, 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended by 48 STAT. 584 (1934), 7 U.S. CA.
§ 499 (Supp. 1935), as amended by Pub. L No. 702, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 19,
1936). The validity of the statute was assumed in Spano v. 'Western Fruit Growers,
83 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), and Barker-Miller Distributing Co. v. Berman,
8 F. Supp. 60 (W. D. N.Y. 1934); cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois
ex rel McLaughlin, 298 U.S. 154 (1936); Krueger v. Acme Fruit Co., 75 F. (2d)
67 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
5. Practical considerations as to effective administration may also have influenced
Congress to employ different methods. Thus, it may have been thought that the
shippers of basic commodities were too widely scattered and disorganized to make
marketing agreements effective. And the crop ct rtailment plan may not have been
applied to non-basic commodities because many of them are sold without processing,
and thcrefore afford no basis for a processing tax. See .4chlieing a Balanced Agriculture
(Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1934) 26.
6. Section 11, 48 STAT. 38 (1933) as amended by 48 STAT. 528 (1934), 48 STAT.
670 (1934), 49 STAT. 782, 7 U. S. C. A. § 611 (Supp. 1935), defined the basic com-
modities as wheat, rye, flax, barley, cotton, field corn, grain sorghums, hogs, cattle,
rice, potatoes, tobacco, peanuts, sugar beets and supitcane, and milk and its products.
Under the control plan the acreage or production for market of these commodities
was to be reduced a flat percentage through voluntary agreements with producers in
return for rental or benefit payments financed by processing taxes. See Report of the
Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 3835 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 3. While under
the original Act marketing agreements were made for wheat, tobacco, peanuts, and
rice for the purpose of facilitating exports or carrying over during the 1933 emergency,
most of the agreements covered milk and similar perishable products. Nounsr,, MAnxr-
ING AGREMNTS UNDER THE A. A. A. (1935) 64 et scq.
7. Section 8(3), 48 STAT. 35 (1933).
8. Section 8(2), 48 STAT. 34 (1933). The first expression of the marketing agree-
ment idea was in the McNary-Haugen Bills. See Hearings before the Committee on
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The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Butler, invalidating the
production control and processing tax sections of the Adjustment Act, has
raised a perplexing question as to the status of the marketing control sections.
Nevertheless, the government is looking to them, as an organic part of its
farm program, to provide a framework within which effective cooperation
among competing producers can be secured, and with it a potential realiza-
tion of market economies, and a control of trade practices, which it con-
siders a step toward orderly agricultural marketing.
The details of the marketing sections of the Act, as amended in 1935,10
may be summarized as follows. Sections 8b and 8c empower the Secretary
of Agriculture to issue orders and make marketing agreements with pro-
ducers and handlers of agricultural commodities in the current of interstate
commerce.1 ' These orders and agreements are intended to effectuate a com-
prehensive regulation of. several phases of the marketing process. Thus, they
are to limit total shipments to markets during a season or shorter period,
prorating the quota-for the industry among individual shippers on the basis
Agriculture on H. R. 16o3, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ; Hearings before Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 48o8, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927).
9. 297 U. S. 1 (1936), (1936) 49 HARV. L. Ray. 828. See Grant, Commerce Pro-
duction and the Fiscal Powers of Congress (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 751, 991.
10. 49 STAT. 753, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 608b, 608c (Supp. 1935). Before the decision
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), invalidating the
codes under the National Industrial Recovery Act, a number of lower courts had
refused to enforce licenses issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the original
marketing control provisions of the Adjustment Act. Berdie v. Kurtz, 75 F. (2d)
898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Darger v. Hill, 76 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Edge-
water Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Columbus Milk Pro-
ducers' Co-op Ass'n v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 1014 (N. D. Ill. 1934); United States v.
Neuendorf, 8 F. Supp. 403 (S. D. Iowa 1934); United States v. Greenwood Dairy
Farms, 8 F. Supp. 398 (S. D. Ind. 1934); Douglas v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 379 (W. D.
Okla. 1934). Royal Farms Dairy v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934); Wallace
v. Smith, 11 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Tex. 1935); Allen v. Wallace, 12 F. Supp, 515
(N.D. Okla. 1935). The Secretary was sustained in only two cases: United States
v. Calistan Packers, 4 F. Supp. 660 (N. D. Cal. 1933); United States v. Shissler,
7 F. Supp. 123 (N. D. Ill. 1934). When the decision in the Schechter case indicated
that the marketing provisions were too broad in including transactions "in any way
affecting" interstate commerce, the House Committee on Agriculture proposed amend-
ments to the Adjustment Act substituting orders for licenses, setting forth the nature
of the orders in detail, and restricting their scope to transactions "in the current of
interstate or foreign commerce, or which directly burden, obstruct, or affect" such
commerce. See 79 CONG. REc. 9457 (1935). These amendments were adopted. 49 STAT.
753, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 608b, 608c (Supp. 1935).
11. Under § 8c of the amended Act orders may be issued only for a limited number
of commodities and their products: milk, fruits (not including apples, or fruits for
c-nning, other than olives), tobacco, vegetables (not including vegetables for canning,
other than asparagus), soybeans and naval stores. Milk and tobacco were basic com-
r.odities within the crop control and processing tax provisions of the original Act.
48 STAT. 38 (1933), 7 U.S.C. §611 (1934).
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of each shipper's current or past business.' 2 In addition to direct proration,
rather high standards of quality are to be employed whenever necessary to
exclude low-grade products.' 3 Likewise, orders may compel shippers to
sell only at prices filed in accordance with the terms of the order.'4 Whatever
cannot be shipped, either because of low quality or because of production in
12. Sections 8c(6) (A)-8c(6) (C). Under the order regulating California and Arizona
oranges and grapefruit, each shipper must report to the Growers Advisory Committee
the amount of fruit which he controls under authority to ship or to which he has legal
title or for which he has paid 5% of the purchase price. Order Regulating the Handling
of Oranges and Grapefruit (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1936)9. The shipper's individual
prorate base is then computed by the Committee as the ratio of the amount of fruit
controlled by the shipper to the total amount of fruit grown in California and Arizona.
According to this prorate base, the shipper is allotted a share of the total weekly
shipments which the Distribution Committee deems advisable in view of market con-
ditions. Id. at 10, 11. Shippers may exchange allotments, or may exceed them by a
percentage of tolerance, but in no case may the shipments for the entire season exceed
the total of the allotments. Id. at 12. Terms similar to these are found in orders
regulating California pears, plums, and peaches; Colorado peas and cauliflower; Florida
citrus fruit; and Washington lettuce, peas, and cauliflower. The orders regulating
walnuts and Southeastern watermelons, on the other hand, provide only fo stasonal
limitations. Marketing agreements and orders for milk and its products may not contain
any limitations on the marketing of such products. Section 8c(6) (G). On the purpase
of periodic limitation of shipments, see BnAun, ThE CiTRus Pn.omum (Agric. Adjust.
Admin. 1934) ; BRAU= AND GOLD, PRICES A .D INcOMEn IN -rE NAVAL STOnES IDUSMn"
(Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1934); GoLD, THFE MAR ETING OF VATEUELO-S (Agric.
Adjust. Admin. 1936); VELIAN, REGULATING SHI'ENTs OF CALIFOZINA ORANGES
(Univ. of Calif. 1936). The theory underlying periodic limitations is that a larger
quantity of fruits and vegetables can be moved at a higher average price to growers
in a stabilized market than in a demoralized one. See Taussig, Is Market Price
Determinate? (1921) 35 QuAi. J. Ecom 394. This amounts merely to saying that in
an efficient market more goes to producers and less to middlemen than in an inefficient
market; the quantum of profit decreases as the factor of risk is reduced. Cosnoxs,
INSTITUTIONAL Ecoizomics (1934) 555.
13. Section 8c(6) (A). Regulation of grade, size, or quality is provided for in all the
general crop orders except that for California oranges and grapefruit. It is argued
in NOURSE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 322 et seq., that this method of increasing returns
by preventing the competition of inferior grades is more complicated than it seems.
In the milk orders grades are based on butterfat content and on the use to which the
milk is put by the distributor; milk for fluid purposes receives the highest rate. See,
for example, Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in The Greater Boston Marketing
Area (Agric. Adjust Admin. 1936) 6, 7; Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in
the St. Louis Marketing Area (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1936) 5-7.
14. Section 8c(7) provides that each order shall contain one or more terms pro-
hibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices in the handling of
the commodity, providing (except for fluid milk and cream) for the sale of the
commodity only at prices filed by the handler, and providing for the selection by the
Secretary of agencies to administer the order, make rules and regulations, investigate
violations, and recommend amendments to the order. The Secretary has not yet
required the filing of prices under any order. The St. Louis milk order is the only
one regulating unfair practices: "Each handler shall refrain from acts which constitute
unfair methods of competition by way of indulging in any practices with respect to the
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excess of quota, is to be placed in a reserve pool'8 from which amounts
may be withdrawn if current harvests fail to provide sufficient quantities
for market needs; the remainder may be distributed to relief agencies, ex-
ported, or converted into by-products. The agreements become effective
upon issuance of an order by the Secretary. While an agreement may be
the basis of such an order only if signed by handlers of 50% of the volume
of the product, an order may issue without an agreement if the Secretary
finds that the shippers' failure to sign an agreement would obstruct the policy
of the Act. Approval of the orders by producers is in some degree assured
by the provision requiring the Secretary to determine that the issuance of
the order is favored by two-thirds of the producers or producers of two-
thirds of the volume of the commodity. 16 Failure to obey the Secretary's
order is punishable by a heavy fine for each day's violation, 17 and the federal
courts are given jurisdiction to impose such fines' 8 and to entertain proceed-
ings by the Secretary to enjoin the violation of the Act or of orders issued
under it.' a Further penalties may be levied upon any person willfully exceed-
ing any allotment or knowingly aiding or participating in such act by means
of a forfeiture equal to three times the market value of the excess. 20 In
many cases, however, the usual administrative procedure of allowing the
violator a hearing on an order to show cause why proceedings should not
be instituted may secure compliance without resort to the courts.
21
transportation of milk for, and the supplying of goods or services to, producers from
whom milk is purchased, which tend to defeat the purpose and intent of this order."
Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in St. Louis Marketing Area (Agric. Adjust.
Admin. 1936) 9, 10.
15. Section 8c(6) (E). A surplus pool is provided only in the walnut order. Order
Regulating the Handling of Western Walnuts (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1935) 9-14.
Compare the method employed under the AGRICULTURAL MARKETING ACT, 46 STAT.
11 (1929), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1141-1141j (1934).
16. Sections 8c (8) and 8c (9). Compare § 3(a) of the NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL REcovERY
Act, 48 STAT. 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 703(a) (1934). Presumably the Secretary may
determine whether the specified percentage of producers approves the proposed order
at the hearing provided under §§8c(8) and 8c(9).
17. Section 8c(1 4). No penalty is imposed between the date of the petition and
the date of the Secretary's ruling upon a handler who files a petition in good faith
under § 8c(15).
18. Section 9 of the JUDICIARY ACT, I STAT. 76 (1789), 28 U. S.C. § 41(9) (1934).
19. JoNS-Cos oAxn ACT, 48 STAT. 675 (1934), 7 U. S. C. § 608a(6) (1934).
20. JONEs-CosTIGAzN ACT, 48 STAT. 674 (1934), 7 U. S. C. § 608a(5) (1934).
21. General Regulations (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1933) Series 3. Of the 653 com-
plaints made between August 1, 1933, and June 1, 1935, 330 were adjusted without
proceedings; "show cause" orders were issued in 323 cases; 59 cases were adjusted
before hearing; and in 53 cases ground was found for court action. NouRsE, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 271-272. For the purposes of enforcing the marketing agreements
or orders under the amended Act, the Secretary is empowered to require reports from
handlers and signers of agreements, and to examine books and other records. Section
8d(1). Compare Comment, Investigatory Powers of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (1936) 44 YALE L. J. 819.
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The procedure in issuing orders or agreements and in carrying out their
provisions consists essentially of monopolistic self-regulation by a group of
competitors supervised by the Secretary; proposed orders, drafted in most
cases by the producing or shipping groups, are discussed at formal hear-
ings conducted by representatives of the Secretary to ascertain the need for
regulation ;22 but there is no representation for consumer interests, as such, and
no effective pressure against monopolistic action by producers.3- a In general
the orders provide for one or more committees or control boards selected, by
the Secretary on nomination of growers and handlers.23 These comiittees
perform the field work in administering orders and agreements and in making
the rules and regulations covering the operations of the control plans. Their
action, however, is not final in most proceedings. The approval of the Sec-
retary is necessary for the fixing of prorate bases and allotments and the
amendment of orders ;24 and handlers who desire to be exempt from an
order or who claim that any provision is not imposed in accordance with
the law may petition the Secretary for a hearing on their grievance, subject
to a court review of the Secretary's ruling on the petition. 5
The experience of the government in this adventure in public control is
probably too short to allow evaluation of its.results. Of the orders thus
far issued under section 8c, the seven applying to general crops, such as
citrus fruits, walnuts, and watermelons, have been uniformly characterized
by a system of quotas, while the five applying to milk have principally
22. Sections 8c(3) and Sc(4); General Regulations (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1936)
Series A; Ibid. (1936) Series B. The evidence introduced at the hearing provides
the foundation for findings called for by § Sc(4). To the effect that due process requires
such findings of fact in administrative orders, see Panama Refining Co. v. R)yan, 293
U. S. 388, 431 (1935); cf. Pacific States Box Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 16 (1935)
(administrative order upheld despite lack of findings). Although under the original
Act [§8(3)] due notice and opportunity for hearing was given before a license was
revoked, licenses could be imposed without granting a hearing. The provisions of
the amended Act dispel doubts as to the validity of this procedure by clearly meeting
requirements of notice and hearing. See generally Comment (1934) 34 CoL L Rnv.
332.
22a. Contrast §3(b) of the Brrummsous COAL COxSEvRATlro Acr, 49 STAT. 992,
15 U.S.C.A. §803(b) (Supp. 1935), which provides for a Consumers' Counsel to
represent the consuming public in proceedings before the National Bituminous Coal Com-
mission [§ 3(a)] ly offering evidence and argument, examining witnesses, requesting the
issuance of a subpoena or other process, conducting investigations, or requesting the
Commission to furnish information or conduct investigations.
23. For example, under the walnut order the Control Board of nine members in-
cludes eight selected from a panel of 32 nominated half by growers and half by dis-
tributors; the ninth member is selected from nominees of the Control Board. Order
Regulating the Handling of Western Walnuts (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1935) 5, 6.
24. Sections 8c(6)(B) and Sc(6)(C). Under §Sc(16)(A), the Secretary may
terminate any order or provision of an order which he finds obstructs or does not
effectuate the policy of the Act.
25. Section 15.
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employed direct price-fixing. The intention of the milk orders, as in most
state milk control plans, is to set the price of milk according to classes based
on the use to which it is put.26 The system prevents surpluses by furnish-
ing the producer with powerful economic incentives to produce no more
than the quantity and quality of milk that can be handled advantageously,
since whatever milk cannot be sold at the relatively high fluid milk price is
paid for at the lower cream or by-product prices.27 In the case of general
crops, however, instead of naming a minimum price and abiding by the
decision of the market as to what volume of products will be absorbed at
that level, the orders have attempted to limit shipments to a point below
the normal volume in order to bring about a desirable price level by a re-
striction of supply. 28 In addition, it is hoped that the system of proration
over short periods will induce growers to plan a staggered harvesting pro-
gram whereby the flow of products to market and the movement of whole-
sale prices will be steadied.
29
It is not surprising that the attempt on a large scale to introduce govern-
mental sanctions into the field of agricultural cooperation should meet with
determined opposition and present delicate problems of enforcement. In
two cases it has been necessary for the government to institute legal pro-
ceedings. In one,30 the United States district attorney sought an injunction
restraining the defendant from engaging in interstate commerce unless he
applied for allotments under the order regulating California oranges and
grapefruits. The district court issued an injunction, holding that section 8c,
under which the order was issued, was separable from the sections invali-
dated in United States v. Butler;31 that there were sufficient standards
setting reasonable limitations on the discretion of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture ;32 and that section 8c constituted a valid regulation of interstate com-
26. Section 8c(5) (A). Although § 8c(5) (B) provides the alternative of a uniform
method of payment, the use classification has been generally employed. See BLACK,
THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND THE A. A. A. (1935) 152.
27. Black, op. cit. supra note 26, at 269.
28. In the walnut order the "salable percentage" is fixed at 70. Order Regulating
the Handling of Western Wahnts (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1935)8.
29. A consideration of recent figures indicates that the California citrus order may
have secured some degree of stability in the industry. From April, 1934, to November,
1935, the index numbers of the price of California oranges fluctuated between 45.5
and 70.7. During the first five months of proration, starting in February, 1936, the
index numbers moved between 55.8 and 56.6. Wholesale Prices (U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1934-1936) Monthly Bulletins.
30. United States v. Edwards, 14 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Cal. 1936). A permanent
injunction has been issued, with opinion. United States v. Edwards, Dist. Ct., S.D.
Cal. Sept. 8, 1936.
31. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
32. The question of delegation of powers has been sufficiently covered elsewhere.
See Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative Power to Executive Officials (1935)
33 MICH. L. REv. 512; Comment (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 798. The detailed specifi-
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merce which was unobjectionable on grounds of due process. In the otherP
on an application for a mandatory injunction to compel twenty-eight de-
fendants to comply with the order regulating the handling of milk in the
Greater Boston area, the court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the marketing provisions were designed to regulate production rather
than commerce, and that they were inseparable from the processing tax and
production control provisions voided in the Butler case, and therefore invalid.
In view of recent decisions, the issue of separability may have an important
bearing on the ultimate fate of the marketing provisions of the Adjustment
Act. The conventional formula for determining whether a provision is
separable from invalid portions of a statute specifies two tests. First, it is
said that the provision in question must be capable of being practically admin-
istered alone ;34 and second it must be found that the legislature would have
enacted the statute stripped of its invalid portions,33 despite a presumption
that the legislature intended the act to be effective in its entirety2 It seems
clear that the marketing provisions satisfy the first requirement, for they
have been separately administered with no more than the usual practical
difficulties ever since the effective date of the Adjustment Act, and continue
to be so administered although the remainder of the Act has been rendered
inoperative. But their separability is more doubtful when tested by the second,
requirement. A finding as to what Congress would have done had certain
provisions been removed from the Act before its passage must inevitably be
based largely on speculation. Perhaps the best evidence on this question is the
fact that the statute contains the now familiar separability clause,3 providing
cations found in § 8c indicate that the provisions are not subject to challenge on the
ground of indefiniteness as to the content of the orders. Section 8b requires merely
that marketing agreements effectuate the policy of the Act; but the question of dele-
gation of power may not arise, since the agreements are wholly voluntary. See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
33. United States v. Buttrick, 15 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1936).
34. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924); Warren v. Mayor and
Aldermen of Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99 (fass. 1854) ; People ex rd. Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 60, 129 N.E. 202, 207 (1920) ("The principle
of division is not a principle of form. It is a principle of function.") ; I CooLzY, Coz-
STrruTnoNAL LruTATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 359; Comment (1927) 40 HAIIv. L. REV. 626.
35. Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80 (1880) ; Butts v. Merchants & Miners Trans-
portation Co., 230 U. S. 126 (1913).
36. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 695, 696 (1892) (tariff act); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 395, 396 (1894) (income tax act) ; Connolly
v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565 (1902) (anti-trust act) ; Riccio v. Mayor
of Hoboken, 69 N.J. Law 649, 662, 55 AtL 1109, 1113 (1903).
37. A number of recent statutes have included a separability clause. TrEi SEcunrrns
Act, 48 STAT. 88 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §77z (1934); SEcumTEs ExcHau E Act,
48 STA. 905, 15 U. S. C. § 78gg (1934); NATxoNAL INDusTRLL Rscovmny Act, 48
STAT. 211 (1933), 15 U.S. C § 711 (1934); SocutL SEcumTY Act, 49 STAT. 648,
42 U. S. C. A. § 1303 (Supp. 1935) ; Pumuc UTuLrry HOLDIG Co, pANY Act, 49 STAT.
.837, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79z-6 (Supp. 1935); BrruutNous CoAL ConsunvArxou Act, 49
1936]
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that a judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of any section of the
statute is not to affect the validity of the remaining provisions. Such a clause,
while not conclusive, should at least be considered a strong indication that
Congress would have enacted the marketing provisions alone.38 The steady
expansion and simplification of judicial power is reflected in the ease with
which the Supreme Court ignores these clauses. For example, despite the in-
clusion of a separability clause, it was held in Carter v. Carter Coal Company80
that the price regulations of the Guffey Coal Act 40 were inseparable from
the invalid labor provisions, on the ground that Congress would not have
enacted the price regulations alone. The Court justified its conclusion by rea-
soning that without the labor provisions, the Act would not accomplish its prin-
cipal objective of a balanced control of the coal industry. It can be argued that
this reasoning, however valid it may be in the Carter case, is not pertinent
in the case of the marketing provisions, which, instead of forming one of
two parts of a single regulatory system designed to balance each other, con-
stitute one of two schemes intended to solve different problems by different
methods, one regulating directly the production of basic commodities, and
the other regulating the marketing of non-basic commodities. 4 1 But such
arguments are of doubtful value in predicting the ultimate disposition of
the marketing sections; the vagueness of the second requirement of separa-
bility, demanding judicial clairvoyance as to what Congress would have done
had things been otherwise than they were, appears to leave the final answer
largely to the sympathies of the Supreme Court.
The traditional theories of congressional power over interstate commerce
provide formulae broad enough to sustain the provisions of the marketing
orders limiting the quantities and fixing the prices of commodities moving
across state lines.42 Sales made in interstate transactions, whether preceding
or following shipment across state lines, appear to constitute interstate com-
merce itself within all the definitions thus far suggested by the Supreme
STAT. 1007, 15 U. S. C. A. § 819 (Supp. 1935); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs. AcT, 49
STAT. 457, 29 U. S. C. A. § 165 (Supp. 1935).
38. It is said that a separability clause reverses the presumption that the legislature
intended the act to be effective in its entirety. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
63 (1932) (longshoremen's compensation act); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost,
286 U. S. 165, 184 (1932) (license tax act); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm., 286 U. S. 210, 234, 235 (1932) (oil production allotment act); cf. Williams
v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 242-44 (1929) (gasoline price-fixing act; pro-
visions regulating unfair practices held inseparable).
39. 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
40. 49 STAT. 991, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 801-827 (Supp. 1935). See Comment (1935)
45 YALE L. J. 293.
41. See discussion in Hcarings before Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 5585,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) passim.
42. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I (U. S. 1824); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321 (1903) ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913); Ribble, The Current of
Commerce (1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 296; Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns
More States Than One (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335.
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Court 4 3 To regulate the factors of price and quantity in such transactions
is therefore to regulate interstate commerce, not merely circumstances ante-
cedent to, or consequent upon interstate commerce." The present Supreme
Court clearly had this argument in mind when it said in the Schechter case:
"But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the transportation
of the poultry from other States to New York, or the transactions of the
commission men or others to whom it is consigned. or the sales made by
such consignees to defendant. When . . the poultry was trucked to
their [defendants'] slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition .
the interstate transactions . . . ended." 4 5 But whether or not the marketing
provisions can be sustained as regulations of interstate commerce per se, they
seem clearly valid when compared with the regulations which have been
upheld on the doctrine that Congress may regulate activities directly affecting
such commerce. In the stockyards and grain exchange cases0 federal regu-
lation of the practices and charges of commission men and the conduct of
brokers was sustained; and if it be objected that the activities there regulated
occurred at an intermediate point in the flow of interstate conmerce rather
than at its source or termination, reliance may be placed upon cases arising
under the Shernan and Clayton Acts,47 in which the Supreme Court has
upheld national regulation of activities whose principal effect was upon the
price and quantity of goods moving in interstate commerce, whether those
activities occurred in the state of origin or destination. If Congress may
restrain price-fixing and monopolistic control of distribution by indlividuals
43. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant. 257 U.S. 2&7, 290 11921);
Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 59, 60 (1q22): Flanagan v. Federal Coal
Co., 267 U. S. 977, 225 (1925); Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam &-
Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927): Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific Stutv-
Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 64 (1927); cf. Baldwin v. Seelig. 294 U.S. 511
(1935). Cases involving state laws imposing license taxes, occupational taxes, or the
like furnish ready analogies. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S.
4S9 (1887); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Crew Levick Co. v. Penn-
sylvania. 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
44. See Powell. The Scope of the Comnerce Po,,er in EssAYs xx Hoxaor OF FnL,:sK
J. GoODNOw (1935) 197.
45. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 542, 543 (1935).
46. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922): Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S.
1 (1923): Tagg Bros. & Mfoorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
47. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904) ; Northern Securities Co. V.
United States. 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375
(1905) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court has held
that the refusal of union men in one state to handle goods made in a non-union
factory in another is an undue restraint of trade. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921): Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters! Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927): cf. Coronado
Coal Co. v. United -Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Local 167, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934); Comment (1935)
35 CoL L. Ray. 1072.
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where interstate commerce is concerned, it would seem to follow that, aside
from the question of due process, Congress itself may fix prices and control
distribution in such commerce.
Perhaps the main attack on the foregoing argument will be based on the
contention that here, as in Hammer v. Dagenhart,48 the power to regulate
interstate commerce is being invoked to support what is in fact a regulation
of production beyond the reach of the federal government. The proposition
seems to ignore fundamental differences. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the
evil sought to be regulated was a part of the productive process with no
apparent relation to the movement of goods. But in this case the regulation
is designed to solve a serious marketing problem in which the movement of
commodities in interstate commerce plays a significant part; it may realistically
be contended that any effect the regulation may have upon production is
incidental.
.If the regulation of interstate transactions is sustained, perplexing prob-
lems may arise as to when the varying fraction of product moving in intra-
state commerce can be included within the scope of regulatory orders.40
Under the doctrine of the Shreveport case,50 the federal government may
regulate transactions otherwise within the sphere of state control when
necessary to render effective the exercise of the interstate commerce power
and prevent discrimination against interstate commerce. In the case of milk
and other commodities which are produced in a large number of states, it
may be argued that a denial of federal control over the marketing of a
product within the producing state would allow the intrastate product to
undersell competing products coming in from other states whose price would
be determined under a marketing order, and that the resulting discrimination
would be a burden on interstate commerce and seriously impede the national
agricultural program. This argument is weaker, however, in the case of those
commodities whose sources of supply are concentrated in a few states, for
theft there is likely to be little interstate movement into the producing states
in any event.5
°a
48. 247 U. S. 251 (1918). See Cushman, The National Police Power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution (1919) 3 MiNN. L. REV. 289, 381, 452; Powell,
Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 61.
49. In the case of walnuts and oranges, for example, about 90% of the total pro-
duction moves across state lines. Order Regulating Handling of Western Walnuts
(Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1935) 1: Order Regulating Handling of Oranges and Grape-
fruit (Agric. Adjust. Admin. 1936) 1.
50. Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); cf.
Wisconsin R. R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & A. R. R., 257 U. S. 563 (1922);
Florida v. United States, 292 U. S: 1 (1934).
50a. Under the changed wording of the Act [see supra note 10] a court may invali-
date an order attempting to regulate intrastate commerce on the ground that the order
is nonstatutory rather than that the statute is unconstitutional. Cf. Ward Baking Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 330 (C. C.A. 2d, 1920).
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The provisions of the marketing orders most vulnerable to attack on the
ground that they constitute restraints upon the liberty of commercial action
within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment are those limiting shipments
of general crops and fixing the prices of milk. Admittedly price fixing and
limitations on commerce both deprive the entrepreneur of his potential right
to obtain by negotiation more or less than the fixed price or to sell more than
the fixed quantity. Whether or not the federal government now has the
power to impose such restrictions on business activity in interstate com-
merce remains, of course, a matter for the discretion of the Supreme
Court ;51 but the Court's acquies~ence in other exercises of federal control
over interstate business, including price fixing, leaves the question less open
to doubt5
2
Like any discussion of power rather than policy, this survey of the con-
stitutional issues raised by the agricultural marketing statute should be quali-
fied by an inquiry into the contribution which marketing control can make
to a generalized plan for agricultural control. It is plain enough that the
51. For those who seek to forecast through consideration of the cases, the validity
of the provisions in issue will depend upon a comparison between their reasbnableness
and the reasonableness of statutes fixing house rents, Block v. Hirsh, 255 U.S. 135
(1921) ; attorneys' fees, Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540 (1925) ; coal prices, Highland
v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929); stockyard agencies' charges,
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); insurance agents'
commissions, O'Gorman & Young -. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931);
and petroleum quotas, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S.
210 (1932); and the unreasonableness of statutes regulating labor conditions in meat
packing houses, Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923); milk price differentials, Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1
(1927) ; theatre ticket brokers' charges, Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) ;
employment agencies' fees, Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); gasoline prices,
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); and entrance into the ice industry,
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
52. As a result of the decision in Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 218
U.S. 557 (1886), federal regulation of railroads has never been seriously challenged.
It has been held that Congress may regulate railroad rates, Gulf, Colorado & S. F.
Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263
U.S. 456 (1924); fix wages and hours of labor on railroads, WVilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332 (1917); provide for arbitration of railway labor disputes, Texas & New
Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930);
and regulate the charges of stock-yard agencies, Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930). But cf. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R.,
295 U. S. 330 (1935). Although the cases may be distinguished as relating to
business affected with a public interest (cf. Hamilton, Affectation ilth Public Interest
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089], it is thought by some that Nebbia v. New York, 291"
U.S. 502 (1934) has eliminated the concept of public interest. The rule of the Nebbia
case states the principle of due process in a simple, but inclusive form: "Price control,
like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory,
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt. . . . " 291
U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
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problem of economic planning for agriculture will not be solved even if the
statute survives in the courts. While the halting attempts at regulation now
under way, affirming legislative recognition of a widespread loss of faith in
economic individualism, may be a real advance in efforts to cope with the
farm problem, the provisions in question hardly provide even the machinery
for a permanent solution of that problem.
In the first place, the marketing schemes set up and administered under the
statute, like all such efforts at co-operation among competitors, establish a
mechanism of monopolistic control over the distribution of necessities, and
endow it with power. While restrictive activities of shippers and producers
within the marketing programs are subject to supervision by the government,
the administration has thus far been chiefly concerned with raising farm
prices, and has placed little emphasis on protection of the unrepresented con-
suming public. In its effort to raise prices, the government seems to have
confused price rises effected by monopolization, which reduce output, with
price rises responsive to greater income, which increase it. Manifestly,
cartellization of this type is no substitute for economic policy; its effect is
merely to permit one group to profit at the expense of the economic welfare
of the community.53 Furthermore, even if the government does preserve some
sort of balance between farming and consumer interests, marketing control
will not aid in solving the fundamental problem of the uneconomic applica-
tion of land. Although a decrease in production does result from marketing
limitation, the reduction may come from a decreased output from each pro-
ductive unit rather than from the elimination of sub-marginal farms.0 Final-
ly, if marketing control is successful in raising agricultural prices by reducing
output, the farm products affected may be at a corresponding disadvantage
in the world market. Either all hopes of retaining or increasing farm ex-
ports must be dismissed, or resort had to some form of subsidy.r5
The modest value of the marketing provisions as a factor in long-range plan-
ning therefore seems to lie in the legal machinery they afford for achieving
an orderly marketing system-a necessity in any permanent scheme, for the
relief of agriculture.
53. A clear exposition in a popular style of the faults of rationalization may be found
in FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931); PIGou, EcONoMIxcs IN PRACTICE
(1935) c. vi. See also CHAMIDERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(Harvard Economic Studies, 1933); LIEFMANN, CARTELS, CONCERNS, AND TRUSTS
(1932) 51 et seq.; ROBBINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1935) c. vii; Watkins, Book
Review (1936) 44 J. POL. Ecox. 563.
54. See Hearings before Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 5585, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) passim.
55. See SCHULTZ, VANISHING FAR'M MARKETS AND OUR WORLD TRADE (World
Peace Foundation, 1935); TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND FOREIGN TRADE (1935).
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